As the pointless bloodbath in Najaf drags on, Ayatollah Sistani has finally returned from hospital treatment in London, and looks likely to be the only person to come out of this disaster with any credit[1]. His march on Najaf will, it seems likely, allow Sadr and the American-Allawi forces to reach the kind of face-saving compromise that has been the only possible outcome all along, apart from the disastrous option of an assault on the shrine and the martyrdom of Sadr.
Update #1 27/8 I’ve come across a useful piece by a former Senior Adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority, Larry Diamond, linked, with some interesting comments by Gary Farber Gives an account of the Coalition’s dealings with Sadr and other militias (minor snipe: Diamond uses “prevaricating” when he means “vacillating” to describe this).
Update #2 27/8 Like most people not actually on the scene who seek to be well-informed about Iraq, I’m indebted to Juan Cole for his informed comment and information on the situation. He’s just put up a post assessing the winners and losers from the Najaf situation which matches, almost point for point, what I posted yesterday. Of course, it carries a lot more weight coming from him than from me.
Of the other parties, the biggest losers have been the unfortunate people of Najaf. Dozens have been killed, hundreds wounded and thousands left homeless. From all the reports, they (correctly) place part of the blame of the blame for this on Sadr but even more on the American forces. There have also been hundreds more casualties in other towns where the fighting has spread. All of this because someone in the US command decided that this would be a good time to eliminate Sadr and his militia.
The other big losers are the Coalition forces and everyone (including most readers of this blog) represented, willingly or not, by those forces. The Shi’ite world has been outraged by the fighting, and large parts of Southern Iraq are now in the same ‘no-go zone’ state that already characterized the Sunni section of the country. If we avoid a Shiite version of Al-Qaeda, it will be by the good graces of people like Sadr, who continues to denounce terrorism as un-Islamic (while being happy to engage in common-or-garden political thuggery).
Meanwhile, Coalition forces are still boasting about the hundreds of Sadrists they have killed. Perhaps they haven’t noticed that the people they have killed (mostly unemployed young men who have gained nothing from the invasion) all have brothers and cousins, bound in honour to avenge them, not to mention friends eager to share in their glory.
The Allawi government has also lost a lot of ground. Domestically, the alternating bravado and backdowns of the past few week have eroded what support it began with. Meanwhile, its habit of dealing with journalists by rounding them up at gunpoint has guaranteed a hostile press. A straw in the wind is the refusal of the British Labour Party conference to countenance a visit by Allawi, pushed hard by Blair.
Moqtada Sadr has also lost ground on balance, and will lose more if Sistani is seen to be the successful peacemaker. Still he defied the Americans for weeks on end, and looks likely to live to tell the tale. Among his core constituency this will count as a win.
It’s increasingly obvious that the Coalition should have held interim elections at the earliest opportunity using ration books for an electoral roll. Almost certainly, Sistani’s supporters would have won. If the elections planned for January 2005 go ahead, the same outcome will probably be achieved, with a delay of more than a year, and a loss of thousands of lives.
A Sistani-dominated government would be Islamist, but not in the Khomeini theocratic mould. It wouldn’t be liberal in any sense, but it’s by far the best option that has any chance of coming to pass at this point. The alternatives include an authoritarian regimes headed by Allawi, Sadr or someone similar, or a descent into outright chaos.
fn1. There have been some suggestions that Sistani’s health was fine, and that the trip to London was based on inside information, and a desire to be away from Najaf when the balloon went up. If correct, these suggestions given Sistani fewer points for moral credit, but even more for political judgement than my analysis, based on the assumption that his health problems were genuine.
{ 30 comments }
Jon Moyer 08.26.04 at 2:19 pm
A tad ironic that the Gandhi role in this drama is played by an Iranian-trained Shiite ayatollah.
kevin donoghue 08.26.04 at 2:30 pm
Four posts on al-Sadr: it’s getting to be an obsession isn’t it? While there is much in what you say, you won’t win any converts to your view. Defenders of US actions mostly say that all these fights were started by Sadr and that he is implacably opposed to democracy, hence he must be destroyed. Both claims are dubious but hard to disprove. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that he is opposed to Allawi, and Allawi is America’s man. Saddam could have told them he’s a tough one to kill.
Muqtada has not lost any ground as far as I can see. A guerrilla can defer to a cleric without losing face.
dave heasman 08.26.04 at 2:40 pm
If Sistani’s health problems are genuine, and he’s 75, he’s putting himself under a lot of stress very soon after an op. Let’s hope it was a diplomatic illness. In which case props also go to the UK Govt for playing along with it (through the keyboard equivalent of gritted teeth).
Giles 08.26.04 at 2:55 pm
If Sistani is the tactical genius with the wide spread support that some people seem to imply, how did he allow his spiritual icon, hometown and base, Najaf to be hijacked so easily by a load of unrespected outsiders from Baghdad? If he’s a political genius how come support for Sadr, his main rival for the Shiite vote, support in the polls is up while his seems to be down?
I think his return once the fighting is over only proves that a large proportion of his support is illusory, an illusion he has to maintain as his political nous doesn’t seem to be as sharp as it once was.
The wise respected all seeing old leader is a figure that we all like to believe in, but exist no more in the East than he does in the West.
David Sucher 08.26.04 at 2:56 pm
“…(mostly unemployed young men who have gained nothing from the invasion)..”
I think that sums up your position nicely. And sadly.
dsquared 08.26.04 at 3:06 pm
My read of the situation is close to John’s, but with perhaps a bit less blame on US High Command. From (pretty obsessively) monitoring the news on this one, the pattern seems to have been that the Allawi government has spent the last three weeks continually making wild claims about the imminent destruction of the Sadrists, while the US forces have been obviously and understandably reluctant to cash the checks.
Walt Pohl 08.26.04 at 4:09 pm
Giles: Sistani was in the hospital.
Sebastian Holsclaw 08.26.04 at 4:13 pm
“As the pointless bloodbath in Najaf drags on…”
If it is pointless, it is pointless precisely because we listen to people like you who want to leave Sadr free to foment revolution.
bob mcmanus 08.26.04 at 4:15 pm
Yglesias comments on this at Tapped. Juan Cole is of course, the indispensable blog. I am shocked there has so little blogging on what looks to me like the tipping point in Iraq.
Much is going on behind the scenes, and Sistani could be working with the Americans here, but it would be the first time. I think it is very important that Sistani came in thru Basra and not Baghdad airport.
Allawi has nearly achieved an official status as Mayor of Baghdad. Or maybe just the Green Zone.
bob mcmanus 08.26.04 at 4:22 pm
Oh. And I think a key thing to remember is that any Iraq who appears to be acceptable to America will not be legitimate in the eyes of the Iraqi people. I hope somebody in the WH understands this. At one point I thought that was why they were discrediting Chalabi. And why I said Sistani might be working with the Americans here.
Sadr is no huge threat, Holsclaw, he is just a thug. If someone can gain legitimacy by defying America in letting Sadr go, it might be worth it.
Giles 08.26.04 at 4:24 pm
walt – the last time sadr took over najaf sistani wasnt in the hospital and despite the great support and respect he enjoyed, he was unable to do anything about it other than say, please leave.
Point is not only is he not all powerful, he’s also increasingly ill. Not a good board on which to pin your hopes methinks.
g-lex 08.26.04 at 5:31 pm
What a great thread: a pleasure to read and a pleasure(even if saddening) to learn here. Thanks.
Dan Hardie 08.26.04 at 5:49 pm
Dsquared, I agree with you about the US Army seeming to hold back from over-use of force, but the WaPo reported at length some time ago that their reporters had been told that the battle in Najaf kicked off when junior Marine Corps commanders decided to go after Sadr, without referring things up the chain of command. If true- and the WaPo did say it felt that some of the reports were motivated by US Army resentment of the USMC- that is utterly incompetent, even insubordinate behaviour: mid-level commanders should simply not be making these sort of major decisions on their own. The report didn’t say what level commander made the decisions, though: Major General in charge of a division? Lower than that?
JQ: have to disagree with you that
‘Coalition forces are still boasting about the hundreds of Sadrists they have killed’- haven’t heard any British, Polish or Italian spokesmen making such boasts. Sistani left Iraq for London and then re-enters Iraq through British-run Basra: is it not rather obvious that he gets along with one coalition partner rather more than he does with the Americans? It would be interesting to know who Sistani does his liaison with in the British team; it would also be interesting to know if the Americans are complaining to Blair about British ‘softness’ on the Shi’ites or not.
‘If it is pointless, it is pointless precisely because we listen to people like you who want to leave Sadr free to foment revolution.’
Sebastian, I would not normally call you ‘stupid’ but just this once I will. Is it really the case that US military operations in Iraq are meeting with a certain lack of success ‘precisely because we’ (meaning I suppose the US government, or the US military) ‘listen to people like you’ (meaning John Quiggin)? Ah, the Bush administration, pitiful captive of Liliputian social democrats, some of them living in Queensland; the brilliant policies of the US military in Iraq, guaranteed success but for the machinations of the bleeding-heart liberals… Come on, this stuff falls into the ‘beyond parody’ category.
Dan Hardie 08.26.04 at 6:02 pm
USMC Major General, btw, would be in charge of something called a ‘Marine Expeditionary Force’, which as far as I can tell is a division by another name.
fdl 08.26.04 at 6:05 pm
Sebastian, I can pretty much guarantee that the Bush admin doesn’t read (or, more importantly, rely) on Crooked Timber. “The fault lies not in our bloggers, but in ourselves” quoth Rumsfeld.
Lets see: Allawi wants to muscle Sadr without alienating Sadr City or the Shia. Sadr wants power for himself and the US out. So, without having made any visible policy decision, we have become the militia for one group over another in a creeping civil war. If we ignore Allawi, destroy the Mahdi Army and kill Sadr, the “legitimate government” will lose what few shreds of credibility appear to be hanging on to it.
Hmm. This is CT’s and my fault!?
Francis
nick 08.26.04 at 6:17 pm
The report didn’t say what level commander made the decisions, though: Major General in charge of a division? Lower than that?
A USMC Colonel at most, and, judging from the write-up, possibly even a Lieutenant Colonel. The 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit arrived in Iraq in July to provide supply and support in and around Najaf. It was the MEU which acted on the request of the governor of Najaf — a guy shipped in from Dearborn, Michigan last year — and it’s the Lt. Col. in charge of the Battalion Landing Team who explains what decisions were made.
The reports of ad hoc tactical decisions by the Marines also make this op-ed by one of the 11th MEU majors in Najaf seem rather, um, problematic:
When critics of the war say their advocacy is on behalf of those of us risking our lives here, it’s a type of false patriotism. I believe that when Americans say they “support our troops,” it should include supporting our mission, not just sending us care packages. They don’t have to believe in the cause as I do; but they should not denigrate it. That only aids the enemy in defeating us strategically.
No, mate: ‘turn[ing] a firefight with al-Sadr’s forces on Aug. 5 into a eight-day pitched battle without the approval of the Pentagon or senior Iraqi officials’ is what defeats you strategically. Nice one.
Dan Hardie 08.26.04 at 6:44 pm
Cheers, Nick- very useful references.
abb1 08.26.04 at 6:48 pm
Sadr wants power for himself and the US out.
There is no doubt that he wants the US out, but I haven’t seen any evidence that him wants power for himself.
What if, perhaps, he is just an Iraqi patriot — you know, like Joan D’Ark?
There are many people over in Iraq who look like they want power for themselves: Allawi and Chalabi for example. I don’t see them attacking US troops: that would be the most counterintuitive way to gain power.
Motoko 08.26.04 at 6:55 pm
This Time article, pointed out by Juan Cole, seems like a good overview of the whole Najaf situation.
abb1 08.26.04 at 7:08 pm
that’s “he wants power for himself”, of course.
Steve 08.26.04 at 10:46 pm
Of the other parties, the biggest losers have been the unfortunate people of Najaf. Dozens have been killed, hundreds wounded and thousands left homeless.
The fact that there are actually people in Najaf–that is, people who have nothing to do with either side in this ongoing bloodbath–is entirely absent from American media coverage. It’s only on the BBC that I’ve heard the slightest mention of civilian casulaties; every American source is restricting itself to Coalition forces and Sadr’s militia.
Kinda reminds me of the invasion last year–if you limited yourself to American news sources you could easily come to the conclusion that the entire country of Iraq consisted of sand, oil wells, deserted buildings, and Saddam Hussein.
seth edenbaum 08.26.04 at 11:04 pm
The wild wild web.
http://www.sistani.org/html/eng/
John Quiggin 08.26.04 at 11:58 pm
“Four posts[1] on al-Sadr: it’s getting to be an obsession isn’t it?”
I felt the danger of being seen as obsessive, and have deliberately avoided posting on the topic unless I thought I had something new (new for me that is, not necessarily strikingly original) to say.
But if I’d posted twice as often on Swift boats and the Alabama National Guard, no-one would have thought it odd.
Even in the blogosphere, there is, it seems, a consensus about what is news and what is not.
fn1. In three weeks
Dan Simon 08.27.04 at 3:01 am
As the pointless bloodbath….drags on….face-saving compromise….has been the only possible outcome all along, apart from the disastrous option of an assault….the biggest losers have been the unfortunate [local] people…Dozens have been killed, hundreds wounded and thousands left homeless. From all the reports, they (correctly) place part of the blame for this on [the local radical] but even more on [the pro-Western] forces….All of this because someone….decided that this would be a good time to eliminate [the local radical] and his militia.
The other big losers are the [pro-Western] forces….The [local] world has been outraged by the fighting….[pro-Western] forces are still boasting about the hundreds of [local radicals] they have killed. Perhaps they haven’t noticed that the people they have killed (mostly unemployed young men who have gained nothing from the [presence of pro-Western forces]) all have brothers and cousins, bound in honour to avenge them, not to mention friends eager to share in their glory….
[The local radical] has also lost ground on balance….Still he defied the Americans for weeks on end, and looks likely to live to tell the tale. Among his core constituency this will count as a win….
_____
Hmm, where have I heard all this before? Al Qaeda/the Taliban in Afghanistan (and later in Western Pakistan)? Saddam Hussein in Iraq? Arafat in Ramallah? Just about every Hamas/Islamic Jihad “militant” who survived a missile strike in Gaza? It all just sounds so….familiar, somehow….
I’m sure one day it’ll be correct, and blowing some anti-Western fanatic and his minions to smithereens in some godforsaken corner of the Middle East will turn out to be a bad idea. I’m just not sure I want to bet on this time being the first….
Jack 08.27.04 at 9:23 am
I’m sure one day it’ll be correct, and blowing some anti-Western fanatic and his minions to smithereens in some godforsaken corner of the Middle East will turn out to be a bad idea.
dan s., Just because you havent been blown up doesn’t mean that it’s been a good idea. Why do you think the list of Islamic radicals is so long?
Also I think you are creating a straw man by ignoring the rather obvious differences between these situations and also displaying the radical oversimplification that makes these situations so hard to handle.
Without going into too much detail, we went into Iraq to liberate it from Saddam right? So why are we fighting one of his most persistent enemies outside the most holy temple of the Shia? Is this going to help the progressive cause in Iran?
Surely blowing people to smithereens is always a bad idea. Now sometimes there may be a countervailing good that would come from it but in this case I think your (not uncommon) inability to articulate a reason for doing so speaks volumes. I also find it depressing that you don’t feel embarassed to call one of the most holy shrines in Islam “godforsaken”.
kevin donoghue 08.27.04 at 9:52 am
“But if I’d posted twice as often on Swift boats and the Alabama National Guard, no-one would have thought it odd.”
I would. Consider it a compliment. For the likes of Instapundit to keep strumming away on the same chord is nothing unusual – what else can these guys do? But you have things to say on a range of issues (and I’m still puzzled as to why you take such a gloomy view of the US current account deficit).
Of course Najaf is important and the gist of what you say is sound; but look at Sebastian Holsclaw’s comment to see how the debate is progressing.
I will elaborate on this in a comment to the latest post on Najaf (by Chris) when I have a minute. Perhaps I am becoming obsessed.
praktike 08.27.04 at 3:06 pm
John, one concern I have is that Sunnis and Kurds, and secular urbanites will pitch a fit and declare a Shi’ite Islamist government illegitimate.
What do you think?
Dan Simon 08.27.04 at 7:15 pm
Jack:
1) “Why do you think the list of Islamic radicals is so long?” (implicitly attributing the problem to American military interventions against them) is far more of a “radical oversimplification” than anything I said. Why was the list of KKK radicals in the Southern US in the 1950’s so long? Did Northern military and police intervention lengthen or shorten that list?
2) My understanding is that Moqtada al-Sadr is hardly “one of [Saddam Hussein’s] most persistent enemies”. His father may have been, but the son’s prominence appears to be relatively recent, and centers on his efforts at overtaking (or eliminating) his own post-Saddam rivals.
3) I didn’t articulate good reasons for attacking Sadr’s militia because I thought the reasons were utterly self-evident. The man is vehement in his anti-Western, anti-American, totalitarian-theocratic rhetoric, and has exhorted his fellow Iraqis to kill Americans at every opportunity. He is also attempting a violent takeover of Iraq, with the obvious intent of molding the country according to his anti-American, anti-Western, totalitarian-theocratic vision. Is the rationale for stopping him really that hard to see?
4) I mean no disrespect to Shiite Muslims, but I think it’s fair to say that a shrine that has spent thirty-odd years under Ba’athist rule, and is now occupied by gun-toting Sadrist maniacs, deserves to be described as “godforsaken”.
John Quiggin 08.27.04 at 8:57 pm
“John, one concern I have is that Sunnis and Kurds, and secular urbanites will pitch a fit and declare a Shi’ite Islamist government illegitimate.”
praktike, I’m concerned about this too, and mentioned it in my first post on Sistani, linked above. My main response is that this is the best option, not necessarily a good one.
Reasons for some optimism:
(i) The Kurds will, in the end, settle for the status quo of effective autonomy
(ii) At this point, it’s possible to see Sunni groups supporting Sistani on grounds of anti-American nationalism
(iii) the urban secularists don’t have enough power, or alternative options, to do anything
Frans Groenendijk 08.31.04 at 11:59 pm
“Oh. And I think a key thing to remember is that any Iraq who appears to be acceptable to America will not be legitimate in the eyes of the Iraqi people. I hope somebody in the WH understands this. At one point I thought that was why they were discrediting Chalabi. And why I said Sistani might be working with the Americans here.
Sadr is no huge threat, Holsclaw, he is just a thug. If someone can gain legitimacy by defying America in letting Sadr go, it might be worth it.”
Completely agree with Bob B here but I am afraid this (the bold sentence I mean) is wishful thinking. And I don’t want to imply that the one now in the WH is unable to understand this: my worry is on the shortage on all sides to to at least trying to understand the opponents
Nice post BTW as a whole. I tried to write something similar on my own blog but this is much better. I lack the time and the necessary linguistic skills.
I am trying to elicit a comment on the position of Al-Sistani from the Dutch minister of foreign affairs (the Netherlands is now chair of the EU). In vain to this date.
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